It was most often Engels who had the task of presenting the future society, by commenting and developing the indications by Marx, and then, after the death of this latter, in making corrections of great importance. The aim of the article is to show that Engels did not defend just one single notion of socialism, but several. Inhis mind they corresponded to different stages in the construction of communism. For the period of transition following the coming to power of the (...) proletariat, he envisaged a state controlled market socialism. For the period of socialism, as such, he recommended integral planning, abolishing the market. But later he moved away from this idea and approached an associative socialism, more in tune with the aims of communism: in brief, co-operatives, and a plan of orientation, which correspond to two levels of democracy. Finally, the article presents a certain number of critical commentaries in the light of past history and of current research on models of socialism. (shrink)

La thèse défendue dans cet article est que le gouvernement chinois, chapeauté par un Parti qui se revendique encore du communisme, se sert du capitalisme, en le contrôlant strictement, afin d’accélérer le développement, mais sans dévier d’un objectif prioritaire : la construction d’une société socialiste ; et il s’appuie sur le Marx qui pensait que le communisme supposait un haut développement des forces productives. En France, cette thèse est minoritaire, et combattue ; peut-être, paradoxalement, parce que des similitudes existent entre (...) les deux pays. Cependant, les malentendus entre eux sont aussi nombreux (1 re partie). Cela pourrait tenir notamment aux différences de modes de pensée de ces deux peuples, en particulier vis-à-vis des contradictions et des mouvements de la dialectique (2 e partie), comme aussi en matière de mobilisation de la morale par le discours politique (3 e partie). Pour finir, les auteurs analysent les effets de cette comparaison sur l’interprétation du « socialisme aux couleurs chinoises » (4 e partie). Classification JEL : B24, H59, N45, O53, O57, P20, P52. (shrink)

The Privatisation of Public Services : a Privatisation of Democracy ? The article argues that the role of public services goes beyond the provision of « public goods », insofar as they provide « social goods » which form the necessary conditions for the exercise of citizenship, in its political, social and economic dimensions. The article shows that the arguments put forward in support of privatisation are in fact specious, and have been refuted by what has emerged in the wake (...) of privatisation : in essence, a privatisation of democracy, insofar as universal democracy has given way to a consumer vote conditional on a property qualification, a process carried out in dutiful subservience to the interests of financial capitalism. (shrink)

Né du culte militaire et d’un coup d’État raté, le « chavisme » est devenu un phénomène politique. Après avoir survécu au coup d’État de 2002, il a commencé à coloniser l’État dans un processus progressif mais continu dans lequel est apparu un nouveau type de militarisme de gauche que l’on pourrait appeler le « comandantismo ». Ce régime est entré en crise avec la mort de Chavez et la chute des prix du pétrole. Avec Maduro, son successeur, une tentative (...) de réforme a connu le succès dans la lutte pour le pouvoir mais a échoué à obtenir des changements mettant fin à un désastre systémique qui a commencé il y a plus de dix ans. (shrink)

The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also (...) ableto approach the issues of visual awareness andconsciousness in a satisfactory way. Finally weconsider a number of testable empirical consequences,one of which is the striking prediction of thephenomenon of ''''change blindness''''. (shrink)

Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...) prior experiments showing failure to detect changes occurring simultaneously with saccades, flicker, or “mudsplashes” in the visual scene: Many changes were very hard to detect, and Marginal Interest changes were harder to detect than Central Interest changes. -/- Analysis of eye movements showed, as expected, that the probability of detecting a change depended on the eye’s distance from the change location. However a surprising finding was that both for Central and Marginal Interest changes, evenwhen observers were directly fixating the change locations (within 1 degree),more than 40% of the time they still failed to see the changes. It seems that looking at something does not guarantee you “ see” it. (shrink)

In this article we argue that philosophy can facilitate improvement in cross-disciplinary science. In particular, we discuss in detail the Toolbox Project, an effort in applied epistemology that deploys philosophical analysis for the purpose of enhancing collaborative, cross-disciplinary scientific research through improvements in cross-disciplinary communication. We begin by sketching the scientific context within which the Toolbox Project operates, a context that features a growing interest in and commitment to cross-disciplinary research (CDR). We then develop an argument for the leading idea (...) behind this effort, namely, that philosophical dialogue can improve cross-disciplinary science by effecting epistemic changes that lead to better group communication. On the heels of this argument, we describe our approach and its output; in particular, we emphasize the Toolbox instrument that generates philosophical dialogue and the Toolbox workshop in which that dialogue takes place. Together, these constitute a philosophical intervention into the life of CDR teams. We conclude by considering the philosophical implications of this intervention. (shrink)

Meeting grand challenges requires responses that constructively combine multiple forms of expertise, both academic and non-academic; that is, it requires cross-disciplinary integration. But just what is cross-disciplinary integration? In this paper, we supply a preliminary answer by reviewing prominent accounts of cross-disciplinary integration from two literatures that are rarely brought together: cross-disciplinarity and philosophy of biology. Reflecting on similarities and differences in these accounts, we develop a framework that integrates their insights—integration as a generic combination process the details of which (...) are determined by the specific contexts in which particular integrations occur. One such context is cross-disciplinary research, which yields cross-disciplinary integration. We close by reflecting on the potential applicability of this framework to research efforts aimed at meeting grand challenges. (shrink)

In its restless metamorphosis, the environmental movement captures ideas and transforms them into principles, guidelines and points of leverage. Sustainability is one such idea, now being reinterpreted in the aftermath of the 1992 Rio Conference. So too is the precautionary principle. Like sustainability, the precautionary principle is neither a well defined principle nor a stable concept. It has become the repository for a jumble of adventurous beliefs that challenge the status quo of political power, ideology and civil rights. Neither concept (...) has much coherence other than it is captured by the spirit that is challenging the authority of science, the hegemony of cost-benefit analysis, the powerlessness of victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of intrinsic natural rights and inter-generational equity. It is because the mood of the times needs an organising idea that the precautionary principle is getting a fair wind. However, unless its advocates sharpen up their understanding of the term, the precautionary principle may not establish the influence it deserves. Its future looks promising but it is not assured. (shrink)

Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is deprived, (...) is critical for reconstructing the argument, and yields new insight into Plato’s views on the minimal conditions for pleasure. (shrink)

The rapid evolution of information, communication and entertainment technologies will transform the lives of citizens and ultimately transform society. This paper focuses on ethical issues associated with the likely convergence of virtual realities and social networks, hereafter VRSNs. We examine a scenario in which a significant segment of the world’s population has a presence in a VRSN. Given the pace of technological development and the popularity of these new forms of social interaction, this scenario is plausible. However, it brings with (...) it ethical problems. Two central ethical issues are addressed: those of privacy and those of autonomy. VRSNs pose threats to both privacy and autonomy. The threats to privacy can be broadly categorized as threats to informational privacy, threats to physical privacy, and threats to associational privacy. Each of these threats is further subdivided. The threats to autonomy can be broadly categorized as threats to freedom, to knowledge and to authenticity. Again, these three threats are divided into subcategories. Having categorized the main threats posed by VRSNs, a number of recommendations are provided so that policy-makers, developers, and users can make the best possible use of VRSNs. (shrink)

This discussion paper aims to explore potential ethical and moral implications of (patient) centredness in nursing and healthcare. Healthcare is experiencing a philosophical shift from a perspective where the health professional is positioned as the expert to one that re‐centres care and service provision central to the needs and desires of the persons served. This centred approach to healthcare delivery has gained a moral authority as the right thing to do. However, little attention has been given to its moral and (...) ethical theoretical grounding and potential implications for nurses, persons served and the healthcare system. Based upon a review of academic and grey literature, centredness is proposed as a value‐laden concept in nursing inquiry. Potential moral and ethical implications of centredness on nurses/healthcare providers, persons served and the healthcare system are discussed. These challenges are then considered within the context of normative and relational ethical theories. These perspectives may offer guidance relative to how one should act in those circumstances as well as an understanding as to how interdependency and engagement with the other person(s) can help navigate the challenges of a centred care approach. Viewing centredness through an ethical theoretical lens provides a valuable discourse to nursing in efforts to expand the knowledge base and integrate centred approaches into practice and policy. (shrink)

Heidegger’s accounts of Dasein’s dual nature as both individual and social in Being and Time have been a longstanding source of confusion and controversy in the literature. Many critics have been keen to identify contradictions between Heidegger’s positive account of the social nature of everyday Dasein and the putatively solipsistic account of authentic Dasein which comes later. This paper focuses on Heidegger’s brief attempts to sketch the outlines for the notion of something like authentic intersubjectivity. In doing so we will (...) see where the temptation arises to read Heidegger as having failed to remain consistent but also how Heidegger himself is responsible for some of the confusion here. (shrink)

Both in antiquity and ever since the Renaissance Lucretius' De Rerum Natura has been admired – and condemned – for its startling poetry, its evangelical faith in materialist causation, and its seductive advocacy of the Epicurean good life. Approaches to Lucretius assembles an international team of classicists and philosophers to take stock of a range of critical approaches to which this influential poem has given rise and which in turn have shaped its interpretation, including textual criticism, the text's strategies for (...) engaging the reader with its author and his message, the 'atomology' that posits a correlation of the letters of the poem with the atoms of the universe, the literary and philosophical intertexts that mediate the poem, and the political and ideological questions that it raises. Thirteen essays take up a variety of positions within these traditions of interpretation, innovating within them and advancing beyond them in new directions. (shrink)

This paper introduces the state space theory of consciousness, positing that the cortex processes information through delay coordinate embedding operationalized by recurrent neural network engines. This leverages the power of Takens' theorem, giving rise to representations of reality as points within state space. Consciousness is posited to arise at the highest order engines amongst hierarchical and parallel engine pathways. Consciousness is cast as a dynamic process rather than as a neuronal state, reconciling dualist intuitions with a monist perspective. Neuronal representations (...) develop uniquely in each individual due to history-dependent training of these engines, accounting for the privacy of qualia while also addressing cortical plasticity and the heuristic nature of cortical processing. Posited engines exhibit non-linear dynamics that are sensitive to initial conditions, explaining phenomena such as ambiguous figure interpretation and offering a pathway to explaining free will. The state space theory aligns with and expands upon major theories (e.g.higher-order theories, global workspace theories, integrated information theory), essentially providing a computational mechanism that unifies elements of these theories. Future work will explore neural mechanisms and validate predictions. (shrink)

A common reading of the Cyrenaics is that they are a school of extreme hedonist presentists, recognising only the pleasure of the present moment, and advising against turning our attention to past or future pleasure or pain. Yet they have some strange advice which tells followers to anticipate future harms in order to lessen the unexpectedness of them when they occur. It’s a puzzle, then, how they can consistently hold the attitude they do to our concern with our present selves, (...) and yet endorse the practise of dwelling on possible future painful scenarios. To establish that this is a puzzle, though, we must first be convinced that the report is true. Cicero is our only clear source for the Cyrenaic advice, and scholars have noted reasons to be suspicious of the reliability of his report. I discuss these doubts, and why they ultimately fail to undermine Cicero’s testimony as a source. Defending Cicero as a source for Cyrenaic thought removes a barrier to taking seriously an aspect of Cyrenaic psychology which could radically alter our understanding of their views. (shrink)

Many philosophers of language have held that a truth‐conditional semantic account can explain the data motivating the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, but I believe this is a mistake. I argue that these data also motivate what I call “dual‐aspect” uses as a distinct but closely related type. After establishing that an account of the distinction must also explain dual‐aspect uses, I argue that the truth‐conditional Semantic Model of the distinction cannot. Thus, the Semantic Model cannot (...) explain the data for which it is developed and so fails as an account of the referential/attributive distinction. (shrink)

Of all the methodological terms used by Heidegger in the early Freiburg period, few have attracted less consensus than Formal Indication. With its relation to the earliest lecture series, critical debate has tended to focus on the extent to which this concept defines the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The argument of this paper is that Formal Indication is best understood in its relation to Heidegger’s other key methodological term from this period, Phenomenological Destruction. Not only do both concepts (...) grow out of the same problem set, but they act in a limited sense as counter-movements to one another. Considered together, I argue, they make up Heidegger’s response to the problem of language as expressed by Paul Natorp, and first dealt with in the Kriegsnotsemester in 1919. (shrink)

What might queer theory look like if we were to consider it as a hybrid, viral, shapeshifting, post-continental philosophy with cosmopolitical world-making aspirations?

Descartes’s mechanistic account of the passions is sometimes dismissed as one which lacks the resources toadequately explain the cognitive aspect of emotion. By some, he is taken to be “feeling theorist”, reducing thepassions to a mere awareness of the physiological state of the soul-body union. If this reading of Descartes’spassions is correct, his theory fails not only because it cannot account for the intentional nature of the passions,but also because the passions cannot play the role in Descartes’s moral theory they (...) are meant to play. I arguethat Descartes’s account is not best read as a feeling theory. I defend a reading of the Cartesian passions whichacknowledges their mechanistic nature, arguing that for Descartes, passions are modes of the soul withcognitive significance, they are perceptions of relational axiological properties. Thus, Descartes’s theory of thepassions has the resources to connect it with an account of good conduct. As a means of elaborating on thenormative nature of the passions I consider the role of generosity in Descartes’s moral theory. (shrink)